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ABSTRACT 
 
Direct participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group are contested 
and controversial concepts. Recent developments in military and legal doctrine suggest that a 
more practicable account may supplement the valuable work of the ICRC in its Interpretive 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities in order to guide target analysis in the 
unconventional and civilianized operational environment of contemporary non-international 
conflicts. The purpose of this article is to extrapolate criminal law models of accessorial 
liability and co-perpetration in order to elucidate the concepts of direct participation in 
hostilities and membership in an organized armed group. What is proposed is an intelligence-
led framework for target analysis that is grounded in military doctrine and based on a mixture 
of objective and subjective criteria derived from criminal law. This can foster a better 
understanding of the social dynamic that sustains on-going fighting which limits the scope for 
arbitrary and erroneous targeting decisions in doubtful situations.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
This article seeks to develop our understanding of what constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities as well as de facto membership of an organized armed group by extrapolating 
criminal law models of participation and perpetration. A rationale for this proposal is to fill a 
gap in the ICRC’s treatment of this topic in its Interpretive Guidance. Namely, this analysis 
will give consideration to the systematic approaches to linking individuals to groups and their 
activities embodied in the international criminal law relating to modes of liability, but without 
transplanting the criminal law burden of proof to a battle-field context. This synthesis is 
appropriate given that international criminal law has a pertinent regulatory connection with 
target analysis under international humanitarian law and is not necessarily restricted to high-
level persons and large-scale international conflicts. This novel approach to target analysis is 
also feasible as it is grounded in contemporary military doctrine. 
Essentially, this discussion aims to contribute to the discourse by putting the concepts 
of direct participation in hostilities and membership in organized armed groups on a clearer 
and firmer analytical footing for the benefit of military lawyers, intelligence analysts and 
military commanders engaged in targeting analysis at the operational and strategic levels of 
command within full-spectrum and civilianized operational environments. However, there is 
one major pre-requisite for this approach. Namely, that it can only practically apply to 
targeted operations that are planned at the operational level of command, and which occur in 
the context of a non-international armed conflict has has at least reached the common Article 
3 threshold as elucidated in the Boškoskiiguidelines (which are briefly outlined in the 
conclusion) as this serves to confine status-based targeting (on the basis of membership in an 
organized armed group) to a high threshold of applicability. 
 
II. TREATY-BASED LAW ON DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES  
 
Humanitarian law requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants.1 This requirement is qualified by Article 51 paragraph (3) of AP I and Article 
                                                          
* This article is adapted from The Rule of Law in Crisis and Conflict Grey Zones: Regulating the Use of Force 
in a Global Information Environment by Michael John-Hopkins (Routledge, 2017), pp. 185 – 247. Copyright © 
2017 Michael John-Hopkins.  
1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Articles 48, 50, 51 of AP I; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 13.  
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13 paragraph (3) of AP II which both provide that civilians are to enjoy protection against 
attack ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’.2 Given its status as a 
‘fundamental rule of international humanitarian law’, 3 it is of concern that the principle of 
distinction rests on unclear and contentious foundations. As noted by the ICRC, this is 
compounded by the issue that ‘a clear and uniform definition of direct participation in 
hostilities has not been developed in State practice’.4 Furthermore, as the rules of non-
international armed conflict do not provide for combatant status, it is unclear what constitutes 
membership in an organized armed group - a de facto status that deprives an individual of 
their civilian status and thus their immunity from attack on a continuous basis. In view of 
these uncertainties, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance attempted to contribute to our 
understanding of the modalities and parameters of immunity from attack by attempting to 
clarify the distinction between civilians directly participating in hostilities and civilians 
becoming members of organized armed groups.  This is set out diagrammatically below.5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 API, ibid, Article 51(3): Article 51 was adopted by 77 votes in favour, one against and 16 abstentions;  
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Armed Conflicts (Conférence diplomatique sur la réaffirmation et le développement du droit international 
humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés), 1974-1977, CDDH Official Records Volumes I – VI, Volume 
VI, 16. 
3 Prosecutor v Martić (Rule 61 Decision) ICTY-95-11-R61 (March 8 1996), 10.  
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Volume 1: 
Rules, ICRC-Cambridge University Press, 2005) (‘CIHL Study’), Rule 6, 23; Prosecutor v Strugar (Appeals 
Chamber Judgment) IT-01-42-A (17 July 2008), 66.   
5 Nils Melzer, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2009); see also Nils Melzer, ‘Keeping 
the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2009 – 2010) 42 New York Journal 
of International Law and Politics 831, 854. 
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III. THE ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES 
 
 
 
As this diagram suggests, the ICRC interpretive guidance attempts to make a clear distinction 
between temporary loss of immunity from attack on the basis of direct participation in 
hostilities (i.e. targeting on the basis of threat), and most significantly, the complete loss of 
immunity from attack on the basis of a ‘continuous combat function’ which equates with de 
facto membership of an organised armed group (i.e targeting on the basis of status). 6 In other 
words, individuals who are directly participating in hostilities do not lose their civilian status, 
but, rather, may only be lawfully attacked ‘for such time’ as they are directly participating in 
hostilities.  
In contrast, where an individual is considered to be a de facto member of an organized 
armed group, they will no longer be regarded a civilian per se, but neither will they be 
regarded as a combatant in the sense of having combatant’s privilege, meaning that they can 
be subject to attack at any time and in any place and they may also be prosecuted under 
domestic criminal law for fighting in hostilities. Targeting on the basis of this status is 
therefore problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, there remains uncertainty surrounding the 
                                                          
6 Melzer, ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity’, ibid, 887.  The rationale for 
making such a distinction is based on an interpretation of Article 51 paragraph (3) of AP I to the effect an act or 
even acts of participation in hostilities, without becoming a member of an organized armed group, should not 
result in a continuous loss of protection from attack, but rather a temporary loss of protection ‘for such time’ as 
an individual directly participates.  ICRC (Interpretive Guidance), ibid,  44 – 45. This interpretation is premised 
on the notion that using past participation as an indicator of a future propensity to commit hostile acts in order to 
render a civilian targetable for the duration of the hostilities ‘would blur the distinction between temporary 
activity-based loss of protection and continuous status-based loss of protection (due to continuous combat 
function)’. 
 
 Targeting rules.  
 Regular armed forces 
 
Formal / commissioned 
membership 
 
Targetable for duration of 
hostilities, unless hors de 
combat. 
 
Irregular force/ organized 
armed groups. 
 
De facto / functional 
membership. 
 
Targetable for duration of 
hostilities on the basis of a 
'continuous combat 
function'.  
 Civilians 
 
Direct participation in 
hostilities.   
 
Targatable for the duration 
of each hostile act including 
preparation, execution and 
return.  
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precise scope and meaning of what constitutes a ‘continuous combat function’. Secondly, the 
Interpretive Guidance does not expressly identify the threshold at which status-based targeting 
may come into effect. This next section will briefly deal with the first issue whilst the second 
issue will be dealt with in the concluding section. 
 
A. Membership of an organized armed group on the basis of exercising a ‘continuous combat 
function’ 
 
In contrast to membership of State armed forces or other officially constituted irregular 
groups in the context of international armed conflicts, the notion of membership in an 
organised armed group operating in the context of non-international armed conflicts is a 
notion that has so far proved difficult to define due to its context-specific and irregular nature, 
i.e. not  recognized in domestic law or formalized in custom.   The status of ‘irregulars’ is 
unclear, and so more analysis is needed in order to clarify the parameters of civilian 
immunity. Indeed, it is problematic that civilian status is defined in opposition to what are 
essentially equivocal general categories that may be labelled in various ways, such as 
‘terrorists’, ‘guerrillas’, ‘unlawful combatants’, ‘unprivileged combatants’ or ‘criminals’.  
In practice, membership of, or incorporation within an organized armed group is 
problematic vis-à-vis irregularly constituted groups because it can be based on a wide range of 
idiosyncratic, and, in some cases, involuntary features, such as clan or tribal-based 
associations, political or religious affiliations, or ethnic or family ties.7 Given the 
indeterminacy of these ties, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance proposes that ‘membership in 
such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to error, 
arbitrariness or abuse’.8 Rather, the Interpretive Guidance attempts to make a categorical 
distinction between civilians participating in hostilities and membership of an organised 
armed group  by adopting a narrow approach that equates membership with what it describes 
as a ‘continuous combat function’, or to put it another way, de facto or functional 
combatancy.  
Hampson suggests that it is difficult to presume such functional combatancy on the 
basis of anything other than behaviour, and so this concept is just another type of behaviour 
test.9 Whilst this is not disputed, it is suggested that the range of conduct from which we may 
                                                          
7 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 321. 
8 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 33. 
9 Françoise Hampson, ‘Afghanistan 2001 – 2010’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the 
Classification of Conflicts (OUP 2012), 199.  
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infer functional combatancy is by no means an uncontroversial issue, and, in part, this is 
because the significance that is to be attached to any given behaviour may be inextricably 
bound-up with the intention or motive underlying any given activity, the extent to which it can 
foreseeably cause harm, and the nature of its connection to a diffuse organisational structure 
geared towards hostilities.  For example, as will be discussed below, when it comes to forms 
of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) or co-perpetration, it will be necessary not only to have 
intelligence going towards a subjective state of mind (i.e. intent to perpetrate a hostile act or to 
pursue a common hostile design), but that the acts performed are in some way directed to 
furthering an underlying common agreement, purpose or design to commit a harmful act.  
Although the ICRC attempts to forge a clear distinction between direct participation in 
hostilities and membership in an organized armed group, the touchstone it uses to make this 
categorical distinction, namely the ‘continuous combat function’ element, is in part premised 
on the element of direct participation in hostilities, and, as will be discussed below, this 
category is itself highly contentious as it is regarded by some legal experts as being too 
narrow and nebulous to be applied in practice.   
 
‘Individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function’.10 
 
Watkin argues that by creating the ‘continuous combat function’ test for membership, and 
then restricting its scope by tying it to a narrow definition of direct participation in hostilities 
not only disadvantages states engaged in hostilities with organized armed groups, but is 
unlikely to be found credible by the soldiers of states asked to apply such guidance.11 
Accordingly, the next section will briefly summarise and then critique the direct participation 
in hostilities criteria, which is broadly summed up by the dictum that ‘function determines the 
directness of the part taken in the hostilities’, i.e. only broader approaches to harm, causation 
and belligerency are capable of working in practice.12 However, before that, it is worth noting 
that the Interpretive Guidance states that ‘membership in an organized armed group begins in 
the moment when a civilian starts de facto to assume a continuous combat function for the 
                                                          
10 ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 5) 25,  27, 33 34. At para 33: ‘Consequently, under IHL , the decisive 
criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous 
function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter: “continuous combat 
function”)’  
11 Kenneth Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participation in 
Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance’ (2010) 42 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
655, 693 – 694. 
12 Public Committee against Torture v The Government of Israel et al., Israel, Supreme Court, Judgment of 14 
December 2006, HCJ 769/02, 35 – 37. 
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group’.13 In other words, they become members where they ‘go beyond spontaneous, 
sporadic, or unorganized direct participation in hostilities’. 14 
The Interpretive Guidance thus attempts to distinguish between direct participation 
and membership on the basis of the apparent frequency and timing of the acts in question. 
However, without intelligence, soldiers operating at the tactical level would find it near 
impossible to distinguish between a civilian who participates in hostilities on a spontaneous, 
sporadic or unorganized basis (or what Watkin describes as participating on a ‘persistently 
recurring basis’)15 and a member of an organized armed group who performs a ‘continuous 
combat function’.  Indeed, the doctrinal notion of positive identification16 suggests that absent 
a direct and immediate lethal threat, assessing the existence of a ‘continuous combat 
function’, and even distinguishing it from many supportive forms of direct participation in 
hostilities, is a process that can only take place in the context of targeted operations that are 
planned at the operational level of command with the benefit of accurate and reliable 
intelligence as this allows for a variety of objective and subjective considerations to be taken 
into account in order to overcome reasonable doubt that an individual is not directly 
participating in hostilities or a member of an organized armed group.17 Furthermore, as will 
                                                          
13 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 72. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Kenneth Watkin (n 11), 693–694.   
16 Thus, there must be positive identification either of a hostile force or a hostile actor. Identification of a 
hostile actor is based on individual’s manifest hostile action, ie the direct or indirect use of force, or hostile 
intent,  ie the threat of imminent force.  Major Mark Martins, ‘Rules Of Engagement For Land Forces: A Matter 
Of Training, Not Lawyering’ (1994) 143 Military Law Review citing US Army Headquarters, 10th Mountain 
Division, Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N, at para 3b (1993): ‘Hostile intent is the threat of 
imminent use of force against United States Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of United 
States Forces. Factors you may consider include: (a) weapons: are they present? what types?; (b) size of 
opposing force; (c) if weapons are present, the manner in which they are being displayed; that is, are they being 
aimed? are the weapons part of a firing position?; (d) how did the opposing force respond to United States 
Forces?; (e) how does the opposing force act toward unarmed civilians?’ 
17 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Instruction: No-Strike and The Collateral Damage Estimation 
Methodology’ (13 February 2009) 15; Center for Law and Military Operations: Indeed, the US Department of 
Defense instruction on ‘No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology’ goes as far as stating 
that ‘[i]t is an inherent responsibility of all commanders, observers, air battle managers, weapons directors, 
attack controllers, weapons systems operators, intelligence analysts, and targeting personnel to…[e]stablish 
positive identification and to accurately locate targets consistent with current military objectives’. Furthermore, 
the instruction defines the requirement of positive identification as ‘the reasonable certainty that a functionally 
and geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the Law of War …’; 
Center for Law and Military Operations, ‘Legal Lessons Learned From Afghanistan and Iraq, Major Combat 
Operations: Volume I’ (Report) (11 September 2001 – 1 May 2003 ) The Judge Advocate General’s Legal 
Center & School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 72, 98 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-v1.pdf>; Center For Law And Military Operations, ‘Legal Lessons 
Learned From Afghanistan And Iraq: Volume II, Full Spectrum Operations’ (Report) (2 May 2003 To 28 June 
2004) The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 139 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-v2.pdf>; Philippines, AFP Standing Rules of Engagement, Armed 
Forces of the Philippines, General Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1 December 2005, 8(f);  
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair 
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be discussed further below, in view of the ICRC’s recognition that a civilian may cause harm, 
and thus be deprived of their immunity from attack ‘for such time’ as their activities form an 
integral part of, and are closely linked to a specific and co-ordinated military operation, the 
concept of ‘continuous combat function’ may not be regarded as the sole and definitive 
determinant of deprivation of immunity from attack on a continuous basis. 18  
Rather, as it currently stands the Interpretive Guidance maintains the the existence of a 
‘grey area’ that permits a broad margin of discretion to target civilians on a continuous basis. 
As indicated by the diagrams below, due to the indeterminacy as to what amounts to 
‘continuous’ and ‘direct’ hostile acts, the Interpretive Guidance does not satisfactorily make a 
clear and unequivocal distinction between temporary activity-based loss of protection and 
continuous status-based loss of protection due to a continuous combat function.19  This is 
particularly so where ‘temporary acts’ are performed on an intermittent or discontinuous 
basis.20 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Juridische Dienst, 2005, 0548: This may be described as the emerging requirement of ‘positive identification’ 
which can be described as an approach that ‘requires reasonable certainty that the object of attack is verified and 
confirmed as a legitimate military target’. Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, 60 para (6):  
Thus at the very least, this may be viewed as requiring, as far as possible, that soldiers  ‘double-check’ a target 
rather than being ‘too hasty and careless in firing at anyone who [is thought to be] a combatant … [as] [t]here 
are times when it is too late to know that the supposed combatant is just carrying an airgun or a farm tool [or is 
a] friendly …’ 
18 Kenneth Watkin, above (n11) 691. 
19 William Boothby, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities – A Discussion of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance’ 
(2010) 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 157. 
20 Ibid, 154.  
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B. The elements of direct participation in hostilities: an overview 
 
Firstly, the requisite ‘threshold of harm’ has to be met.  In this regard, an act does not need to 
amount to a direct ‘attack’ per se, but rather an act reaches the requisite threshold where it is 
likely to  affect adversely the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed 
conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction. Secondly, there must be 
‘direct causation’ between the act and the harm. In other words, there must be a direct causal 
link in the form of ‘one causal step’ between the act and the harm likely to result, either from 
that act or from a concrete and co-ordinated military operation that directly causes harm of 
which that act constitutes an integral part.21 Thirdly, there must be a ‘belligerent nexus’ 
between the act and the harm caused. This means that the act must be specifically designed to 
cause directly the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another.22  
 
1. Threshold of harm 
 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, the requisite ‘threshold of harm’ is met where an act 
is likely to affect adversely the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed 
conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction.23 Schmitt has criticized this 
criterion in that it is sets the threshold at too high a level and so does not adequately reflect 
military considerations. In particular, Schmitt suggests that this concept is under-inclusive for 
the reason that civilian contributions that generally enhance military capacity would not meet 
such a high threshold requirement.  For example, the training and manufacturing processes 
involved in the use of improvised explosive devices are contributions to one side that will 
typically weaken its opponent, but do not prima facie fall within the ICRC’s framework of 
direct participation in hostilities as they are insufficiently direct so as to be likely to adversely 
affect military operations or to inflict directly death, injury or destruction.24 Furthermore, 
Schmitt notes that within any definition of harm, it was important to make a distinction 
between acts that were directly related to the hostilities and acts that are criminal in nature. 25  
                                                          
21 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n5), 55. 
22 Ibid., 53.  
23 Ibid., 47. 
24 Michael Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis’ (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal, 27. ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 53. Michael 
Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ (2009–2010) 42 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 697, 719, 731.  
25 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 28.   
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This point is important in view of the fact that in hostilities, individuals and groups may take 
advantage of a breakdown in law and order to commit a range of petty and organized criminal 
offences, and this should not be confused with direct participation in hostilities or membership 
in an organized armed group.  
 
2. One causal step 
 
Although ICRC suggested that ‘direct causation’ means that harm be ‘brought about in one 
causal step’, this implies a contrario that there are also indirect forms of causation, but that 
these do not amount to causation for the purposes of participation in hostilities. To bolster 
this, the Interpretive Guidance initially embodies a tactical level focus by stating that an attack 
‘begins only once the deploying individual undertakes a physical displacement with a view to 
carrying out a specific operation’, and that an attack ‘ends once the individual in question has 
physically separated from the operation’.26 The ‘one causal step’ criterion is thus a seemingly 
narrow approach for distinguishing sufficiently ‘direct’ from insufficiently ‘indirect’ acts of 
participation.The coherence and plausibility of this ‘one causal step’ criterion has been called 
into question quite severely by legal experts on grounds of logic and pragmatism. Most 
notably, Schmitt argues that it represents an under-inclusive and contradictory approach to 
causation and suggests states are only likely accept a broader conception of causation that is 
pertinent to ‘the realities of 21st century battlefield combat.27  
In terms of under-inclusivity, Schmitt notes that harm may be brought about by acts 
that are more than one step removed from an attack, and that indirectly contributing to 
capability may result in harm,28 for example through weapons production, logistical support 
and scientific as well as technological research and development.29 Indeed, Schmitt 
provocatively asserts that ‘it is necessary to ... extend participation as far up and downstream 
as there is a causal link, and close the revolving door of participation’.30 It is suggested that 
this particular proposition is far too broad to be acceptable from a humanitarian or even a 
military point of view, and, as will be discussed below, absent a positive identification of a 
hostile threat or intent, the harmful, causal and belligerent aspects of participation in 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 67. 
27 Michael Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities (n 24) 730, 738.  
28 Ibid., 726. 
29 Ibid., 738. Michael Schmitt, (n 24) 30. In terms of weapons production and voluntary human shields, Schmitt 
notes that the ICRC’s treatment of the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) ‘reflects a troubling 
ignorance of the realities of 21st century battlefield combat’ and suggests that ‘States that engage in conflict on 
a frequent or intense scale will certainly reject the Guidance’s treatment of various examples’. 
30 Melzer (n 6) 868.  
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hostilities need to be circumscribed with further objective and subjective considerations 
derived from criminal law modes of liability in order to be sensible in practice.    
Both Schmitt and other legal experts involved in the ICRC consultation process were 
not convinced by the ICRC’s suggestion that the assembly and storage of IEDs as well as the 
purchase and smuggling of component parts do not directly cause harm, such as with the 
actual planting or detonating of IEDs, but are rather ‘connected with the resulting harm 
through an uninterrupted causal chain of events’ that are insufficient to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities.31 To the contrary, Schmitt argues that this suggestion is not feasible 
in that assembly of IEDs will often constitute an ‘integral part of subsequent operations 
almost certain to occur in the near future and relatively nearby’, and so given the clandestine 
nature by which IEDs are emplaced, where there is intelligence relating to their assembly or 
storage then an immediate attack at this stage of the process may be ‘the only option for 
foiling a later operation employing the device’.32 
This bolsters Boothby’s criticism that the ICRC’s ‘direct causation’ criterion narrows 
the notion of direct participation in hostilities to overtly hostile activities that are recognizable 
only at the tactical level, rather than recognizing that hostile acts are likely to be achieved 
through a ‘multiplicity of integrated steps’, rather than ‘one causal step’, which can only 
feasibly be analysed and responded to at an operational level with the benefit of legal, 
political and military analysis.33 Indeed, for a situation to amount to a common Article 3 non-
international armed conflict, an organized armed group must at least have the ability to wage 
protracted hostilities, which implies that it has the ability to mount collective operations. 
However, as Schmitt points out, individuals can be deeply involved in collective operations 
without necessarily directly causing harm themselves. Accordingly, this is problematic as 
according to the ICRC’s criteria, indirect command activities such as ordering or planning, 
and indirect support activities such as assembling and supplying weapons, might not 
constitute direct participation in hostilities.34 
The ‘one causal step’ criterion is seemingly contradicted by an exception that is so 
broad that that it virtually nullifies it. 35 Namely, ‘where a specific act does not on its own 
directly cause the required threshold of harm, the requirement of direct causation would still 
be fulfilled where the act constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical 
                                                          
31 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 54; Michael Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities’ 
(n 24) 731; Kenneth Watkin (n 11) 658.  
32 Michael Schmitt, ibid.  
33 William Boothby, (n 19) 159.  
34 Michael Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (n 24) 731. 
35 Ibid., 730 – 731.  
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operation that directly causes such harm’.36 It is suggested that the parameters of loss of 
immunity are thus extended from individual deployment in an attack to preparatory measures 
that are an integral part of such an attack. Nevertheless, as noted by Watkin, this indicates a 
narrow tactical focus in the assessment of direct participation in that ‘preparation of a general 
campaign of unspecified operations would not qualify as direct participation in hostilities’ and 
this could unduly serve to exclude general planning for future attacks that are executed in an 
opportunistic fashion.37  
However, the Interpretive Guidance does not give any clear guidance on how to 
distinguish between activities that ‘are of a specifically military nature and so closely linked 
to the subsequent execution of a specific hostile act that they already constitute an integral 
part of that act’ from those activities that indirectly contribute to ‘the general capacity to carry 
out unspecified hostile acts’.38 Thus, whilst it may be an evidential challenge to identify and 
to understand the ways in which indirect support activities cause harm in conjunction with 
other acts that may be objectively construed as directly hostile, as the ICRC itself recognizes, 
they cannot be ruled out in absolute terms given that they may be deemed to be ‘an integral 
part’ of a ‘co-ordinated military operation’. For example, the assembly and supply of 
weapons, the supply of information through an organized armed group’s chain of command, 
or most significantly, ordering or planning an operation, may be regarded as being an integral 
part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harm. 39  
Furthermore, indirect support or command roles such as those just mentioned may not 
fit neatly within the narrow temporal parameters of the Interpretive Guidance which are 
framed as ‘measures preparatory to the execution of such an act, as well as the deployment to 
and return from the location of its execution, where they constitute an integral part of such a 
specific act or operation’.40 By way of example, the Interpretive Guidance states that 
‘civilians should be liable to direct attack exclusively during recognizable and proximate 
preparations, such as the loading of a gun, and during deployments in the framework of a 
                                                          
36 Michael Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis’ (n 24), 30. 
37 Kenneth Watkin, (n 11) 660;  ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 66.  
38 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 66. Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and B Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 
Geneva 1987) 34.  The Interpretive Guidance is circular in the sense that it is merely an extended reformulation 
of the starting point set out in the Commentary to AP I of it being necessary to distinguish between activities 
that are part of ‘combat and active military operations’ and indirect activities that are part of the ‘war effort’ 
39 Ibid., 36 & 38. In this way, it has been suggested that the notion of causation links in with the notion of 
temporal scope of participation, in that a civilian may cause harm ‘for such time’ as their act forms an integral 
part of,  and is closely linked to a specific and coordinated military operation. 
40 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 65. 
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specific military operation’.41  This reasoning is problematic in that it assumes the existence 
of that which has first to be established, namely the existence of acts that are ‘recognizable’ as 
direct participation in hostilities.  Acts such as firing a weapon in self-defence or as part of the 
commission of a criminal offence may seem objectively hostile, whilst activities actuating in 
harm, such as clandestine weapons production or planning and logistics, may not be 
immediately ‘recognizable’ as harmful and thus within the scope of direct participation in 
hostilities, even where they are occurring on an ongoing basis.  
 
3. Belligerent nexus 
 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, for an act to amount to direct participation in 
hostilities it must have a ‘belligerent nexus’ or a connection with the surrounding hostilities, 
otherwise it should be dealt with using law enforcement measures.42  Yet the Interpretive 
Guidance construes the notion of ‘belligerent nexus’ in a narrower fashion than that 
developed in international criminal law jurisprudence and is, therefore, not harmonious with 
this related and interconnected branch of public international law.43In particular, according to 
the Interpretive Guidance, to amount to direct participation in hostilities an act must not only 
be ‘objectively likely’ to injure or adversely affect the enemy,  but it must also be ‘specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict 
and to the detriment of another’.44 
Although the term ‘specifically designed’ connotes subjective intent, the Interpretive 
Guidance initially posits an objective standard that does not depend on the ‘subjective’ state 
of mind or ‘hostile intent’ of ‘every participating individual’.45 Indeed, where there is a direct 
and immediate threat, then according to the Interpretive Guidance subjective considerations 
are not generally relevant.46Thus, according to the Interpretive Guidance, the belligerent 
nexus should be deduced ‘objectively’ from the acts themselves. However, this is a rather 
crude behaviour test which does not help to resolve difficulties facing armed forces in the face 
of uncertain facts, or in other words, how to establish that a person to be targeted is member 
of an organised armed group that belongs to a party to the conflict. Again, the proposition that 
                                                          
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid,.  59. 
43 Ibid,. 58 – 59. Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A (12 
June 2002), 58. Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR -96–3 (26 May 2003), 570.   
44 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance), ibid, 58. 
45 Ibid., 59.  
46 Ibid., 58.  
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the belligerent nexus should be deduced ‘objectively’ from the facts themselves is to assume 
that which has to be first established, namely, what are the ‘recognizable acts’ from which one 
can reliably infer a belligerent nexus. 
Despite the proposition of an objective standard, the ICRC necessarily qualifies this by 
suggesting that subjective considerations may be relevant in calling into question ‘the 
belligerent nexus of their conduct’, but only in ‘exceptional cases’.47 For example, this may be 
so ‘when civilians are totally unaware of the role they are playing in the conduct of 
hostilities’,48or situations involving self-defence or the commission of criminal acts unrelated 
to the surrounding hostilities. 49 However, in the context of unconventional and full-spectrum 
operational environment, subjective considerations may not be regarded as ‘exceptional’, but 
a key way, and in many cases, arguably the only way to overcome doubt as to participation or 
status and thus distinguish a continuum of violence 50 which may range from petty and 
organized crime, to isolated terrorists acts and then to combat activities. 51 
 
 
 
Indeed, the Interpretive Guidance actually states that ‘[m]any activities during an armed 
conflict lack a belligerent nexus even though they cause a considerable level of harm’,52 and 
furthermore that ‘loss of protection against direct attack within the meaning of IHL, however, 
is not a sanction for criminal behaviour but a consequence of military necessity in the conduct 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 60. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid., 61. 
50 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) Global Reports on Human Settlements 2007: 
Enhancing Urban Safety and Security (UN-Habitat, 2007) 4, 7-8, 51, 8, figure 1.1. 
51 US Department of the Army (Training and Doctrine Command) Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual 
(FM) 3–24 and Marine Corps War fighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Washington, DC & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC 15 December 2006), 1 – 142. 
52 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 60.  
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of hostilities’.53 In this way, the Interpretive Guidance not only understates the vital practical 
importance of subjective considerations in unconventional operational environments, but does 
not indicate the modalities for distinguishing between those situations where subjective 
considerations should, as far as possible, be deduced in addition to doubtful activities, and 
those situations where the objective purpose of a ‘recognizable act’ can reliably and 
justifiably undergird the deprivation of immunity. As will now be discussed, military doctrine 
has responded to this challenge. This indicates that extrapolation of subjective elements 
associated with criminal law modes of participation and perpetration are both relevant and 
practical in establishing different forms of belligerent nexus as well as  implementing the 
precautionary requirement under IHL to do everything feasible in the circumstances to verify 
that attacks are not directed at civilians. 
 
IV. DOCTRINAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO CONTEMPORARY 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Contemporary military doctrine suggests that where operational planners of offensive strikes, 
such as targeted killings by remotely piloted air systems, conventional air strikes or Special 
Forces, have the benefit of advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
capabilities (ISR), then this will allow for heightened standards of target analysis. Unless 
forces are acting in self-defence or instinctually to a stark life and death dilemma, that is 
where force is used in response to a concrete, specific and imminent threat to life or physical 
safety, then contemporary military doctrine suggests that it is both increasingly feasible and 
strategically important to ensure that tactical patience and persistent ISR make way for a 
more rigorous criteria-based approach to verifying hostile intent. 54 It will be suggested below 
that such criteria can and should be imported from international criminal law. This may serve 
to avoid intelligence flaws, manipulation, and positive identification errors whereby decision-
makers erroneously presume civilian behaviour to be hostile or suspicious, or where they 
have differing interpretations of what it means directly to participate in hostilities or be a 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 61.  
54 Interview with General John Allen, May 10, 2016, Washington, D.C. in Christopher Rogers, Rachel Reid & 
Chris Kolenda, The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm –  Applying Lessons from Afghanistan to Current and 
Future Conflicts (Report) (Open Society Foundations–Washington, D.C. June 2016). Amos Guiora, ‘The 
Importance Of Criteria-Based Reasoning in Targeted Killing Decisions’ in Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, 
Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford University Press, 
2012), 309 and 310.  
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member of an organized armed group.55 In this way, clearer criteria may actually enhance 
effective operational decision making by promoting the correct identification and engagement 
of legitimate targets rather than allowing decision makers to act primarily on subjective 
perceptions about civilian behaviour.   
In view of contemporary operational manuals, doctrine and rules of engagement, as well 
as modern information related capabilities, the ‘fog of war’, whereby information in warfare 
is limited, unreliable and uncertain because of the chaotic nature of combat and the opposing 
sides’ efforts to deceive one another, for example with regards to their command structure 
and intentions, increasingly appears to be an outdated notion, especially in our modern 
information environment and with modern information related capabilities which enable 
heightened standards of target analysis as well as the graduated use of force.56 Examples of 
contemporary military doctrine generally require detailed planning, assessment and positive 
identification of targets as well as mitigation procedures before proceeding with attacks so as 
to avoid the strategic costs associated with civilian harm, such as causing hostilities to 
escalate, weakening the legitimacy of military operations and acting as an obstacle to 
reconciliation. 57 Indeed, operational decisions in planned and unplanned targeted killings 
will usually benefit from direct access to detailed target information, such as visual 
recognition, the target’s characteristics and analytical reasoning that links the target with a 
desired military effect or outcome. 58 It is critically important therefore to avoid positive 
identification errors or faulty assumptions within complex operational environments where 
organized armed groups conceal themselves within high density civilian populated areas and 
                                                          
55 Christopher Rogers, Rachel Reid & Chris Kolenda, The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm –  Applying 
Lessons from Afghanistan to Current and Future Conflicts (Report) (Open Society Foundations–Washington, 
D.C. June 2016), p. 19.  
56  US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (27 November 2012 Incorporating 
Change 1, 20 November 2014), Chapter I and VI; US Department of Defence, Law of War Manual (12 June 
2015), para. 1.4.2.2; US FM 3-24 ( n 51) Chapter I and VII; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint 
Publication 3-60 (31 January 2013), Chapter II; British Army, Countering Insurgency, Field Manual Volume 1 
Part 10 (Army Code 71876), October 2009, Chapters 3 and 5; 2007 Tactical Directive (General McNeill); 
COMISAF, Tactical Directive, December 30 2008; ISAF, Tactical Directive, July 6 2009; ISAF, Tactical 
Directive, August 1 2010; ISAF Tactical Directive, November 30 2011.  
57 JP 3-60, ibid., Chapter II, ‘The Joint Targeting Cycle’; FM 3-24, ibid, Chapter 7; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Close Air Support, Joint Publication 3-09.3 (25 November 2014), Chapter I and Chapter III; US Department of 
Army (Training and Doctrine Command) Operations, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, Washington, DC 14 June 1993), Chapter 6; British COIN FM, ibid, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; UK 
Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security And Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, 
Chapter 5; UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00 (JDP 5-00) (2nd Edition, Change 2), July 
2013, Chapter 3; UK Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning, Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Allied Joint Publication-5 (AJP 5) (with UK National Elements), Chapters 2 and 
3; NATO, Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Interim V1.0, 17 
December 2010, Chapters 3 and 4.  
58 JP 3-60, ibid., Executive Summary, Chapter I and Chapter II; British COIN, ibid.,  Chapter 5. 
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increasingly cyberspace, especially because there are increased pressures for civilians to play 
a variety of direct and indirect support roles within the often diffuse internal support 
structures of organized armed groups that are party to an armed conflict.59 In this type of 
environment, an intelligence-led approach is critical to avoid mistakes, especially in relation 
to whether or not a perceived individual-level threat is integrated into an enemy organisation 
that is organised militarily and which can actuate sufficiently intense collective violence. 
As it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the auxiliaries, fighters and core 
leadership involved in hostilities from elements of the general population or mass base of 
popular support that may provide them with direct or indirect support,  or who are neutral in 
the sense that their activities lack proximity or a nexus with surrounding hostilities,60 military 
doctrine advocates social network analysis (SNA) which seeks to ‘understand the social 
dynamic that sustains on-going fighting’61 in terms of how individual and group functions are 
performed and how they connect to each other and change over time.62  SNA seeks to assess 
the intentions and motivations of individuals as well as the extent to which they contribute to 
the internal support structure of an organised armed group that is engaged in hostilities. In 
this way SNA is a crucial tool for avoiding positive identification errors and manipulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Michael Schmitt, ‘Civilians at War: Deconstructing the 21st Century Battlefield’ (Chatham House 
International Law Discussion Group, A summary of the Chatham House International Law discussion group 
meeting held on 1 November 2007). British COIN, (n 56), Chapter 9. 
60 US FM 3-24 ( n 51) Chapter 3, Chapter 5, Appendix B 
61 Ibid., Chapter 4, Appendix B  
62 Ibid., paras 1-307, 1-309; British Army COIN FM,  (n 56) Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.  
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US Joint Targeting Doctrine suggests that the targeting cycle may not necessarily take place 
in the ‘fog of war’, but rather that targeting decisions may be made well in advance of their 
execution and will often be made jointly at high levels of military and political leadership on 
the basis of human and signals intelligence.63 Indeed, according to John Nagl, a former 
counterinsurgency adviser to a commander of forces in Afghanistan, and former director of 
the CIA, ‘we’ve gotten far, far better at correlating human intelligence and signals 
intelligence to paint a very tight coherent picture of who the enemy is…’64  
As U.S. experience shows, strikes will often be deliberate and planned in advance as 
part of a coordinated joint forces effort overseen by joint staff over a targeting cycle that lasts 
from between twenty four to seventy two hours. 65 Accordingly, rather than responding to 
attacks in the ‘fog of war’, individual targets are usually identified in advance and their 
names are placed on secret ‘kill lists’. In such cases, targets are known, identified and 
engagement actions may be scheduled against them for a specific time, or they may be 
planned without having a specific delivery time. Even with ‘unplanned targets’ that are 
engaged using expedited procedures, there will be pre-existing target analysis in the form of 
an initial decision not to place them on a target list, or to place them on a target list but not 
selecting them for engagement or engagement within the current targeting cycle.66 Where 
there is need for an immediate response, particularly with regards to ‘time-sensitive targets’, 
then ‘dynamic’ planning and engagement may take place over a reduced targeting cycle of 
twenty-four hours.67 Even though this may necessitate a more expedited target analysis at 
subordinate levels of operational command and control, it will still have to go through core 
pre-operational validation, prioritisation, mitigation and execution procedures, which will 
involve gathering intelligence, applying assessment criteria and using ISR to track and 
monitor the target as well as to assess options and risks involved in engaging the target. The 
ability to identify and fix a target allows for tactical patience and persistent ISR to observe 
and track individuals remotely over many hours, or even days, to confirm the existence of 
hostile intent.68 With regards to ‘emerging targets’, namely those that meet the criteria to be 
                                                          
63 JP 3-09.3, (n 57); US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (n 56), Chapters I 
and VI; US; JP 3-60 (n 56);  US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Communications System, Joint Publication 6-0 (10 
June 2015). 
64 Kevin Govern, ‘Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing Bin Laden a Legitimate Military Objective?’ in  
Finkelstein et al, (n 54) 354.  
65 JP 3-60, ibid., Executive Summary, Chapter 3, Appendix C. See also British COIN (n 56) Chapter 3, Chapter 
7. 
66 JP 3-60, ibid., Executive Summary, Chapter II. 
67 JP 3-60, ibid., Executive Summary, Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter III, Appendix C. 
68 JP 3-60, ibid., Chapter II. 
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regarded as potential targets, US Joint Doctrine stipulates that they will normally require 
further ISR and/or analysis to develop, confirm and continue the targeting process. 69 
 
V. INTERCONNECTIVITY BETWEEN MILITARY DOCTRINE, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
 
Criminal law is as sensitive functional modes of participation and perpetration in hostilities as 
military doctrine because, as stated in Tadić, widespread killing in the context of an armed 
conflict does ‘not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals, but constitutes 
manifestations of collective criminality … often carried out by groups of individuals acting in 
pursuance of a common criminal design’.70 It is the diffuse and collective nature of hostilities 
in a non-international armed conflict that provides the rationale for the extrapolation or ‘cross-
fertilization’ of models of accessorial liability and co-perpetration from criminal law in order 
to elucidate our conception of participation and membership in humanitarian law target 
analysis. Criminal law takes account of, and thus seeks to repress, acts that facilitate or 
support the direct or principle perpetration of proscribed and harmful acts. Whilst not 
suggesting that non-state actors are necessarily committing war crimes, it is merely suggested 
that the logic inherent within this process of ascribing principal liability for perpetration, and 
accessorial liability for participation in an act perpetrated by another, is therefore relevant to 
the issue of participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group. It serves 
to put target analysis on a clearer footing so as to enable primary duty bearers to avoid 
arbitrary and erroneous targeting decisions. Moreover, it is suggested that extrapolating 
criminal law modes of liability to target analysis in the context of planned operations can 
serve to restrict the conditions under which civilians may be deprived of their immunity and 
furthermore, that this proposal is grounded in contemporary military doctrine.  
In Tadić, a justification for the repression of activities that support the commission of 
proscribed acts was that ‘the moral gravity of such participation is often no less – or indeed – 
no different - from that of those actually carrying out the acts in question’.71 In this way, 
Tadić noted that ‘the participation and contribution of the other members of [a] group is often 
vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in question’.72 Furthermore,  although the 
Appeals Chamber in Strugar noted that ‘conduct amounting to direct or active participation in 
                                                          
69 JP 3-60, Chapter II 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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hostilities is not, however, limited to combat activities as such’, it went on to state that ‘to 
hold all activities in support of military operations as amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities would in practice render the principle of distinction meaningless’.73 In this regard, it 
is suggested that the logic of criminal law modes of direct and indirect liability are not only 
relevant for the penal repression of activities that contribute to, or support the direct 
perpetration of proscribed acts, but also have import concerning the modes and parameters of 
civilian immunity from attack under humanitarian law.74  
 
General elements of complicity or 
accessorial liability 
General elements of participation in 
hostilities 
Participation in the choate or inchoate 
perpetration of predicate act  
Act likely to affect adversely the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to 
an armed conflict 
Material contribution to perpetration of 
predicate act 
There must be ‘direct causation’ between 
the act and the harm 
Material contribution was intended, reckless or 
done with knowledge of predicate act  
Belligerent nexus: the act must be 
‘objectively likely’ to inflict harm and 
‘specifically designed’ to  cause directly the 
required threshold of harm in support of a 
party to the conflict and to the detriment of 
another  
 
A concern that this discussion aims to dispel is that this approach to addressing lacunae in 
humanitarian law can serve to undermine the principle of distinction by leading to what has 
been described as the ‘complicity cascade’,75 i.e. this proposal constitutes a slippery slope 
towards imposing collective guilt upon civilians or creating a state of total war on the basis of 
the presumption that all hostile acts can ultimately be linked back to civilian activities, and 
therefore civilians and civilian populations are therefore collectively liable and thus open to 
attack. Whilst this type of speculative consideration is of major importance in ensuring the 
existence of humanitarian protections, it must vie with the equally cogent notion that the net 
                                                          
73 Prosecutor v Strugar (n 4).  
74 In this regard, it is also worth noting that if a member of an organized armed group shoots at government 
soldiers during a non-international armed conflict, then this will usually constitute a crime under domestic law, 
and forms of indirect participation or co-perpetration may also attract criminal censure under domestic law. 
75 William Schabas, ‘Enforcing international humanitarian law: Catching the accomplices’ (2001) 83 (842) 
International Review of the Red Cross.  
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of complicity can be as wide as there is reliable intelligence and evidence to demonstrate such 
a link.  Thus, if it is logical to propose that criminal acts with a nexus to surrounding 
hostilities can involve a multiplicity of persons contributing in a range of direct and indirect 
ways, then it is logical to make a similar proposition regarding hostile or belligerent acts. 
Accordingly, individual crimes can be an expression of collective criminality and thus subject 
to penal repression in the same way that individual hostile acts can be an expression of 
collective hostility and thus subject to loss of immunity from attack. The difficulty in both 
respects lies in pinpointing the specific contribution that an individual makes to the collective 
enterprise and in this regard, criminal law is more highly developed than humanitarian law 
and can therefore serve to elucidate further its provisions relating to the parameters of 
immunity. Furthermore, it is suggested that criminal law, with its analytical focus on the 
objective and subjective elements of indirect participation and perpetration possesses less of a 
propensity towards collective guilt than humanitarian law as it currently stands. 76  
Nevertheless, it is suggested that focusing on the different outcomes and functions of 
these interrelated branches of law is not sufficient to preclude cross-fertilization of models of 
complicity, especially given that they are related branches of international public law centred 
around protecting fundamental standards of humanity as well as public order and safety.77 The 
reason for this is that the issue of a civilian’s complicity in hostilities is material to the 
determination of the lawfulness of the attack against them. Indeed, as the Appeals Chamber 
held in Strugar, ‘in order to establish the existence of a violation […] a Trial Chamber must 
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the alleged offence was not 
participating in acts of war …’78 Therefore, where ‘a reasonable doubt subsists’ with regard to 
a civilian’s ‘non-participation in acts of war’ and thus to their immunity, then ‘a Trial 
Chamber cannot convict an accused’ for an unlawful attack. 79 
                                                          
76 ‘The I.G. Farben Case’ : United States of America v Carl Krauch et al., (Judgment of 30 July 1948) in IV 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No 10 Volume 
VIII (US Government Printing Office, 1951): the manufacturers of poison gas were deemed to be not liable as 
accessories to war crimes on the basis that they did not have requisite knowledge of its end use. Furthermore, 
according to the United States War Crimes Tribunal, this knowledge could not be inferred as ‘neither the 
volume of production nor the fact that large shipments were destined to concentration camps would alone be 
sufficient to lead us to conclude that those who knew of such facts must also have had knowledge of the 
criminal purposes to which this substance was being put’; See also Schabas, ibid,  844.  
77 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, Art  43:  ‘The authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the country’. 
78 Strugar (Appeals Chamber Judgment) (n 4) 178. 
79 Ibid. 
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This suggests that ex post facto criminal adjudication must objectively take into 
consideration the circumstances of the victim as well as the outlook of the attacker in order to 
assess whether or not they were ‘participating in acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed 
forces’.80 This implies the need for a balanced interrelationship between what Hayashi 
describes as ‘two combatancy-related presumptions’, namely the humanitarian law 
presumption of ‘mandatory civilian protection’ or doubt on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the criminal law principles of in dubio pro reo and nullem crimen sine lege, whereby any 
doubt is to be resolved in favour of the accused.81 Therefore, the presumption of in dubio pro 
reo, as manifest in the above-mentioned dictum in Strugar, is to be balanced against the 
presumption of doubt in favour of civilians as described in Galić, whereby  ‘[a] person shall 
be considered to be a civilian for as long as there is a doubt as to his or her real status’, and 
furthermore, ‘that a person shall not be made the object of attack when it is not reasonable to 
believe, in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, including the information 
available to the latter, that the potential target is a combatant’.82  
Accordingly, this discussion suggests that there is an important substantive and 
practical relationship between the ex ante and contemporaneous targeting decisions by 
primary duty bearers which are governed by humanitarian law, and ex post facto adjudication 
and jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. 83  In other words, international criminal 
law serves to condition and regulate the use of force under the framework of IHL in terms of 
setting reasonable parameters vis-à-vis the lawful use of military force in situations of 
conflict, and these should be born in the minds of military commanders and military lawyers 
operating within full-spectrum operational environments. In this sense, ICL seeks to give 
military and political leaders advance notice of modes of perpetration and participation that 
may result in criminal liability, and so serves both to deter acts before commission and punish 
acts following commission. In this way, ICL may be regarded as operating upon actors ex 
ante in operations and ex post facto review.   
In turn, this implies that a consideration of modes of indirect participation in and co-
perpetration of hostile acts are relevant to the issue of whether or not an individual was 
                                                          
80 Ibid.   
81 N Hayashi, ‘The Role of Judges in Identifying the Status of Combatants’ (2006) Acta Societatis Martensis, 
76.   
82 Prosecutor v Galić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-98-29-T (5 December 2003) 50.  
83 Antonio Cassese, ‘On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgment on Targeted Killings’ (2007) 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 344.  
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‘participating in acts of war’ so as to adequately balance the two above-mentioned 
‘combatancy-related presumptions’.  
 
VI. EXTRAPOLATION OF CRIMINAL MODES OF LIABILITY 
 
A. Accessorial liability and direct participation in hostilities 
 
As discussed above criminal law models of accessorial liability and co-perpetration are 
relevant to the issue the issues of what constitutes direct participation in hostilities and  
membership in an organized armed group. Not only that, but as this approach is grounded in 
military doctrine it is suggested that it is practicable in the context of planned targeted 
operations. The framework of accessorial liability is a useful concept for elucidating the 
notion of direct participation in hostilities as forms of liability in this regard are derived from 
support given to the commission of a criminal wrong by a principal offender or perpetrator. 
For example international and domestic systems of criminal law not only provide for principal 
liability for the person who directly perpetrates a crime, but also for forms of accessorial 
liability for support roles such as aiding and abetting, planning, instigating and ordering the 
perpetration or execution of a crime.84  
 
 
1. Aiding and abetting 
 
This section contributes to a general framework of target analysis which may be used to 
assess whether the indirect support activities provided by civilians comprising the general 
population, the mass base of popular support 85 and ‘auxillaries’ amount to direct participation 
in hostilities by extrapolating the objective and subjective elements of aiding and abetting as 
developed in international criminal law. 86 It is suggested that where there is intelligence or 
                                                          
84 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the ICTY, Article 6 (1) of the Statute of the ICTR and Article 25 of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.   
85 British Army COIN FM (n 56) 2-15: The base of popular support comprises those elements of the civilian 
population who do not remain neutral, but who play a general, clandestine and indirect role in supporting an 
insurgency or armed groups in their activities. Rather than functioning as active auxiliaries, the base of popular 
support engages in normal every-day civilian activities, whilst at the same time providing general and 
occasional supportive functions such as providing intelligence, concealment, funding and transport. Importantly, 
it is recognized that insurgencies involving clans or tribes, roles and functions are difficult to define and are 
fluid in that individuals have no formal status, but constantly move between combat, auxiliary and follower 
functions; see also US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3 – 24 ( n 51), 1-66.  
86 British Army COIN FM ibid: Auxiliaries have been defined as those ‘active sympathizers’ who play an 
active role in supporting combat activities rather than engaging directly in combat activities. Forms of support 
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evidence that establishes these elements, then a civilian may be targeted for such time as their 
conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities or for such time as their indirect activities 
constitute ‘an integral part’ of a specific and coordinated military operation. 
Beginning with the objective elements, according to ICTY jurisprudence, an 
individual will be liable as an accessory for aiding and abetting a crime where it is 
demonstrated that they offered practical assistance, encouragement or moral support to a 
principal offender or perpetrator and this has a substantial effect on the perpetration of their 
crime(s). Rather than implying a causal relationship, the accomplice must make a significant 
difference the commission of the criminal act by the principal before during or after its 
perpetration. In other words, the criminal act would have occurred in a different way had it 
not been for their factual contribution. 87 
Generally, a ‘substantial contribution’ will be self-evident where there is proximity 
between acts of support and the direct perpetrators. 88 For example, in the Zyklon B Case 
before British Military Court Hamburg, arguments that the provision of poison gas to 
concentration camps amounted to general assistance for lawful purposes were rejected in view 
of evidence demonstrating that the owner and manager of a company which manufactured 
poison gas had provided training to the principal perpetrators in how to use it to kill humans 
in confined spaces and that they knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing 
human beings. 89   
The ICTY Appeals Chamber previously held that in cases of geographical or temporal 
remoteness it will be necessary to demonstrate that acts of support or assistance are 
‘specifically directed’ towards the commission of a crime so as to ensure that there is a 
sufficient ‘culpable link’. For example, a six-month delay between an individual being 
observed unloading weapons and a subsequent attack was considered to reduce the likelihood 
that these weapons were specifically directed towards assisting in this attack.90  However the 
Appeals Chamber has subsequently conducted a survey of ICTY jurisprudence, customary 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provided by auxiliaries may include collecting and transmitting intelligence, running safe houses, sending 
signals and warnings, procuring, transporting and storing weapons, supplies and documents; See also, US FM 3-
24, ibid, 1 – 62. 
87 Prosecutor v Blagojević et al. (Trial Judgment)  IT-02-60-T (17 January 2005), 726 and 777. Prosecutor v 
Šainović et al (Appeals Judgment) IT-05-87-A (23 January 2014) 1626, 1647 and 1649. Prosecutor v Strugar 
(Trial Judgment) ICTY-01-42-T (31 January 2005)  91. Prosecutor v Simić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-95-9-T (17 
October 2003) 161. Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) ICTY-94-1-T (7 May 1997) 688. 
88 Prosecutor v Perešić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-04-81-A (28 February 2013) 38. 
89  ‘The Zyklon B Case’: The trial of Bruno Tesch et al (The Zyklon B Case), British Military Court Hamburg 
1946 (United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals) 93-102. 
90 Prosecutor v Perešić, ibid., 40;  Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-16-A (23 
October 2001, 275 – 277. 
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law and municipal law and has found that specific direction does not constitute an additional 
and free-standing element of aiding and abetting liability.91 Nevertheless, it noted that specific 
direction may at times be factually implicit in a finding that an individual’s provision of 
practical assistance amounts to a substantial contribution.92 Moving onto the subjective 
elements, for an individual to be liable for aiding and abetting it must be demonstrated that 
they know that their acts assist in the commission of the principal perpetrator’s crime. 93  This 
means that they must have knowledge or awareness that the acts they performed assist in the 
commission of a specific crime by the principal and that they knew of the principal’s intention 
to commit this crime.94   
If function determines the directness of the part taken in hostilities, then the concept of 
aiding and abetting provides a useful tool for target planners by elucidating the objective and 
subjective elements of what it means to participate in hostilities. Compared to previous 
attempts at substantive elucidation, this approach narrows the scope of what it means to 
participate in hostilities. Firstly, it requires practical assistance, encouragement or moral 
support that is substantial and which has in a substantial effect on the commission of a hostile 
act. This means that supportive acts that are remote from the commission of harmful acts by 
principal perpetrators may merely amount to acts that are ‘in some way’ directed rather than 
being regarded as substantial contributions towards hostile acts. In other words, indirect 
support activities that are geographically or temporally remote from the direct perpetration of 
hostile acts may be more appropriately described as general assistance directed towards a war 
effort rather than direct participation in hostilities, and so by themselves, they may be 
regarded as being insufficient to result in activity-based loss of immunity from attack. 
Conceivably, this is because a broader range of inferences may be drawn as to the nature and 
purpose of such indirect activities and so the analysis given to what constitutes a sufficient 
culpable link to the surrounding hostilities may be used to elucidate the notion of a belligerent 
nexus. This serves to ensure that there is a clear culpable link in situations where seemingly 
                                                          
91 Prosecutor v Šainović et al  (n 87) 1625.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Prosecutor v Blaskić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-14-A (29 July 2004) 49. Prosecutor v Šainović 
et al (Appeals Judgment), ibid., 1649.  
94 Prosecutor v Delalić et al. the ‘Čelebići Case’ (Trial Judgment) ICTY-96-21-T (16 November 1998) 162 – 
163: ‘the act of participation [must] be performed with knowledge that it will assist the principal in the 
commission of the criminal act’; at para 329: there must be ‘awareness of the act of participation coupled with a 
conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting 
in the commission of a crime’;  With regard to aiding and abetting under the ICCS, Article 25 paragraph (3) (c) 
provides that a person shall be criminally responsible for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court where they 
aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission or attempted commission. In addition, it requires that the 
assistance must be ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime.’ 
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supportive acts are geographically or temporally remote from direct perpetration of harmful 
acts. Secondly, the participant needs to know that their participation assists the hostile act(s). 
Accordingly, in the context of this discussion, activities that seemingly amount to 
‘substantial contributions’ but which are geographically and temporally remote from directly 
hostile acts should attract the presumption of civilian immunity from attack as this remoteness 
decreases the likelihood of a sufficient belligerent nexus. In this way, an individual may only 
be targeted for such time as their support or assistance constitutes a substantial contribution 
towards a hostile act and where the intelligence suggests that they know that their acts play a 
facilitative role. Where there is a delay between an observable act of assistance or support and 
a subsequent hostile act, then the likelihood of that act constituting a substantial contribution 
with a significant effect on the perpetration of a hostile act is reduced. In such situations, 
evidence regarding an individual’s state of mind constitutes important circumstantial evidence 
that may temporarily rebut the presumption of civilian immunity from attack if it indicates 
that they know that their support or assistance is having a significant effect on hostilities. This 
means that in many doubtful cases, temporary activity-based loss of immunity ought to be 
based on evidence or reliable information which suggests that the activities suspected of 
having a substantial effect on the preparation or commission of hostile acts are the sole 
reasonable inference that can be made in the circumstances.  
Although aiding and abetting has been seemingly granted wide reach by the ICTY, for 
instance in cases involving aiding and abetting by omission and cases where psychological 
support is given through words or even physical presence at the scene of crime, it is suggested 
that the elements ‘substantial contribution’ and ‘substantial effect’ represent appropriate 
constraints in order to allay the risk of an overly broad approach to the principle of distinction 
in this context. With regards to the former, it must be demonstrated firstly, that an individual 
has failed to discharge a legal duty and that this has had a substantial effect on the realisation 
of a crime, and secondly that they knew of the principal’s crime and that their omission 
assisted its commission.95 With regards to the latter, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
facilitation through physical presence and/or psychological support is combined with a 
position of de facto authority which lends tacit approval or moral support that has a significant 
legitimising or encouraging effect. 96 
                                                          
95 Prosecutor v Mrkšić (Appeals Judgment) ICTY IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009), para 49. 
96 Prosecutor v Delalić et al. the ‘Čelebići Case’ (Trial Judgment) (n 94) 327 – 328. Prosecutor v Simić (Trial 
Judgment) (n 87) 165. 
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Aiding and abetting will now be distinguished from another mode of liability relevant 
to this discussion, namely the liability of co-perpetrators who participate in a common plan in 
order to distinguish between temporary activity-based loss of immunity on the basis of direct 
participation in hostilities and status-based loss of immunity on the basis of individual 
membership of an organized armed group and exercising a continuous combat function.   
 
2. JCE and Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute  
 
This section aims to contribute to the framework of target analysis by examining the import 
of the ICTY’s approach to JCE as well as the three modes of perpetration or commission 
under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICCS), namely 
individual perpetration, jointly with another person or co-perpetration and through another 
person or indirect perpetration as well as the fourth hybrid mode of indirect co-perpetration. 
On this basis, it aims to distinguish these modes of perpetration  or commission from 
participation, e.g. in the form of aiding and abetting, as discussed above, in order to suggest 
they offer practical ways of distinguishing between status-based loss of immunity on the 
basis of individual membership of an organized armed group, e.g. as a leader, fighter or 
auxiliary, and temporary activity-based loss of immunity on the basis of direct participation 
in hostilities, e.g. by individuals within the general population or mass base of popular 
support.  
It is suggested that these frameworks are not necessarily focused on high-level accused 
but may be used flexibly to encompass those who participate in common plans as leaders and 
as subordinates, and furthermore, they may encompass small-scale to large-scale common 
purposes, for example killing on a village, town or regional, national or international level. 
They may be construed as widely as the strategic plan or common purpose to adversely affect 
military operations or military capacity itself, and this is an objective matter that should be 
properly defined and supported by intelligence. 97 Status-based targeting in this respect can 
only occur in the context of targeted operations where there is reliable intelligence that 
suggests the objective and subjective elements outlined below are in existence.   
According to the ICTY jurisprudence on JCE, a plurality of persons that share an 
agreement, common purpose or common design should be identified, as should the general 
goal(s), temporal and geographical scope and intended victims of the common plan. This may 
                                                          
97 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeals Chamber Judgment) IT-99-36-A (1 September 2004) 421, 422, 423, 424, 
425, 438 
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be inferred from intelligence which suggests the existence of a common pattern.98 
Furthermore, an individual should intentionally make a significant contribution to the 
commission or furtherance of this common purpose, or in some cases they must also have 
foresight that hostile acts outside the common purpose were likely to be committed’. 99 
Similarly, under ICC jurisprudence, co-perpetration refers to a situation where there is a 
common plan or joint agreement between two or more persons. This can be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence.100 Furthermore, such persons must make ‘essential contributions’ to 
this plan in a combined and coordinated fashion.101 Co-perpetrators must have an awareness 
that the consequences of the common plan would occur in the ordinary course of events.102  
Extrapolating the jurisprudence on JCE and co-perpetration suggests that those who 
physically perform hostile acts may not be considered as members of organised armed groups 
where these abovementioned conditions are not satisfied, but rather as direct participants in 
hostilities only in those circumstances where it can be established that they are aiding and 
abetting hostilities, or are ‘tools’ of the members of organised armed groups.103 According to 
ICTY jurisprudence, members may execute their common objective(s) by ordering or 
instructing such non-members who, unlike members, do not share their intention to further or 
achieve the common objective(s) per se. 104 Rather, in the absence of an express 
understanding or agreement, their acts may be regarded as forming part of a manifest 
common purpose, strategic plan or pattern of conduct which can only be explained through 
coordinated cooperation.105 ICC jurisprudence takes a similar approach whereby perpetration 
may occur through another person. In other words, the physical perpetrator of the crime is 
used as a tool by an indirect perpetrator who is masterminding or controlling the physical 
perpetrator behind the scenes.106  Another means of committing a crime through another is by 
means of control over an organization, by an individual, or jointly by several leaders who act 
                                                          
98 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A (15 July 1999) 299. Prosecutor v Krajišnic 
(Trial Judgment) ICTY-00-39-T (27 September 2006) 885. 
99 Prosecutor v Kvocka et al. (Trial Judgment) ICTY-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) 285. 
100 Prosecutor v Lubanga, (Trial Chamber) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) 988. 
101 Prosecutor v Lubanga, (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Confirmation of Charges), 
ICC-01/04-01/06-803, (29 January 2007) 343. Prosecutor v Lubanga, (Trial Chamber), ibid, 994 & 1000. 
102 Prosecutor v Lubanga, (Trial Chamber), ibid, 1008.  Prosecutor v Katanga, (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision 
on the  Confirmation  of  Charges)  ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (30  September  2008) 473. 
103 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeals Chamber Judgment) (above n 97) 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 418, 441, 445. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid.   
106 Prosecutor v Katanga, (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Confirmation of  Charges) (n 102) 488. 
Prosecutor v Lubanga  (Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against his 
Conviction)  ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red (1 December 2014) 465. 
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in concert and provide the contributions necessary for the execution of a common plan.107 An 
organisation must be based on hierarchical relations between superiors and a sufficient 
number of subordinates so that orders given by the recognised leadership will generally be 
complied with by the subordinates.108 Finally, the concept of indirect co-perpetration has been 
developed within the jurisprudence of the ICC for situations where there are two or more 
individuals involved in a common plan executed by subordinates who belong to military 
organisations that are under separate, rather than joint control, e.g. where subordinates only 
accept orders from the leader(s) of their own ethnic group, rather than any leader within a 
joint command.109 Despite the lack of direct control here, where an individual acts jointly 
with another individual who controls the person used as a tool, then their acts may be 
attributed to the former on the basis of mutual attribution. 110 
In summary, where there is intelligence indicating that an individual shares the hostile 
intention(s) of other individuals party to a common plan to engage in hostilities, and makes 
substantial or essential contributions to its furtherance or achievement, then they may be 
subject to status-based targeting for the duration of hostilities as a member of an organised 
armed group as this hostile intent evinces a genuine and continuous combat function. 111 For 
those individuals who are participating in hostilities, but who do not share the hostile 
intention(s) of other individuals that are party to a common plan, then as this may be the 
equivalent of aiding and abetting, they may accordingly be subject to threat-based targeting 
for such time as they are participating in, or making substantial contributions to hostile acts 
but no longer. This approach does not advocate the need to prove these extrapolated elements 
for establishing membership in an organized armed group beyond reasonable doubt in battle-
field context. Rather, it is suggested that where there is doubt as to any of these elements, 
then it is reasonable to resolve it through a process of careful verification112 otherwise 
continuous status-based loss of protection based merely on a slight suspicion, and without 
‘objective’ manifestations of hostile force or actions, could serve to undermine and erode the 
fundamental principle of distinction in non-international armed conflicts involving diffuse 
organisational structures. 113 
 
                                                          
107 Prosecutor v Katanga, (n 102) 498 and 524-526. 
108 Prosecutor v Katanga, ibid., 512. Prosecutor v Bashir, (Pre-Trial Chamber Public Redacted Version of the 
Prosecution's Application under Article 58), ICC-02/05-157AnxA (12 September 2008) 248. 
109 Prosecutor v Katanga, (n 102) 492. 
110 Ibid., 493. 
111  Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Appeals Chamber Judgement) IT-97-25-A (17 September 2003) 75.  
112 PCAT v Israel (n 12) 40. 
113 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n 5) 44 – 45.  
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3. Instigating an act 
 
The concept of instigating, soliciting or inducing the commission of criminal acts can be 
considered to be relevant for targeting the core leadership as well as the political or 
ideological cadre and the auxiliaries of an organized armed group.  Accordingly, the objective 
and subjective elements of this mode of liability will be extrapolated to the notion of 
participation in hostilities.  
The objective elements of instigation are prompting another person to commit a hostile 
act’.114 Targeting an accessory to a perpetrator in this regard will arise only where instigation 
leads to the actual commission of an offence desired by the instigator.115  It is considered to be 
a form of indirect participation as an instigator does not carry out the objective elements of the 
underlying hostile act in question, but if they do, then they will be considered to be a co-
perpetrator.116  Furthermore, it needs to be established that the instigation was a clear 
contributing factor to the conduct of other persons who perpetrated the hostile act.  While it is 
not necessary to demonstrate that the hostile act would not have been perpetrated without the 
involvement of the individual instigator, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was 
a factor that substantially contributed to the conduct of the person or persons perpetrating the 
hostile act.117 
As for the subjective elements of instigation, it must be established that the instigating 
individual intended to provoke or induce the commission of a hostile act, or was aware of the 
substantial likelihood that the commission of a hostile act would be a probable consequence of 
his acts.118  Instigation differs from indirect forms of participation such as ordering in that its 
influence on the perpetrator of an act need not be connected with a superior-subordinate 
relationship or an authority to order.119  
                                                          
114 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) 482 
115 Ibid., 481 - 482. 
116 Héctor Olásolo, The International Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as 
Principles to International Crimes (Hart, Oxford 2010), 142 – 143; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Trial 
Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001), 387; Prosecutor v Orić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-03-68-T (30 
June 2006), 273. Instigation can take place by omission, with threats and menaces, or even with bribery and 
financial promises. An act can be instigated face-to-face as well as through intermediaries.  It can be exerted 
over both  small and large audiences, provided that the instigator has the intent to prompt the audience to 
commit an act. 
117 Kordić and Čerkez, ibid, 32.  
118 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Trial Judgment) ICTY-99-36 (1 September 2004), 269. 
119 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (3rd rev edn Oxford University Press, 2013), 189; Prosecutor 
v Orić (Trial Judgment) n 117) 272.  As stated in Oric: ‘… although the exertion of influence would hardly 
function without a certain capability to impress others, instigation [is different from] ‘ordering’ [because 
ordering] implies at least a factual superior-subordinate relationship [whereas instigation] does not presuppose 
any kind of superiority’. 
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Furthermore, instigation differs from ordering in that they have different tests for 
causation. Whereas ordering requires, that hostile acts be committed in furtherance of the 
order, or that the order has a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the hostile 
act,120 instigation merely requires that it be clear and contributing factor of the commission of 
the hostile act.  Instigation need not cause in the physical perpetrator the intention to commit 
the hostile act. Instead, all that need be established is that the instigation strengthens the 
perpetrator’s will or resolve to commit the hostile act by providing additional motives or 
reasons for its commission.121  In this regard, by itself, instigation can be considered to be to 
be a form of indirect participation in hostile acts. Given that it is not punishable per se, it is 
suggested that loss of protection from attack may not occur unless it is having a ‘direct and 
substantial effect’ on the commission of hostile acts, in which case its duration is temporary to 
the extent that loss of immunity occurs only for such time as there are hostile acts being 
committed.  
 
4. Planning an act 
 
This section contributes to a general framework of target analysis by suggesting that the 
objective and subjective elements of planning the perpetration of an offence as developed in 
international criminal law may be used to identify and target the core leadership122  as well as 
the political or ideological cadre 123 and the auxiliaries of an organized armed group. It is 
suggested that where there is intelligence that establishes these elements, then where planning 
can be considered to be ‘an integral part’ of a specific and co-ordinated military operation, 
then this may thus lead to a deprivation of immunity from attack. However, given that the 
majority of approaches discussed below base liability for planning on a choate offence, i.e. 
actual perpetration or attempted perpetration, then it is suggested that by itself, planning may 
                                                          
120 Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-99-54A-A (19 September 2005) 75. 
121 Prosecutor v Blaskić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-95-14-T (3 March 2000), 270, 277; Héctor Olásolo (n 116) 
142–147; Prosecutor v Orić (n 117): instigation ‘does not necessarily presuppose that the original idea or plan to 
commit the crime was generated by the instigator. Even if the principal perpetrator was already pondering on 
committing a crime, the final determination to do so can still be brought about by persuasion or strong 
encouragement of the instigator’. 
122 British Army COIN FM (n 56): The role and attributes of military and political leaders are generally 
organizing and planning at the strategic and operational levels. They provide the strategic direction and 
ideological impetus to the movement that underpins the activities of auxiliaries, the political cadre, combatants 
and the mass base of support; See also US FM 3-24, above n.452, 1-61.  
123 British Army, COIN FM, ibid., 2-15: The political or ideological cadre is not necessarily formally 
constituted, for example, into a political party or extremist group, but in substance, its function is to assist with 
the organization, planning and direction necessary for the implementation of the overarching political or 
ideological goals that stem from the leadership; See also US FM 3-24, ibid, 1-65.  
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only result in temporary loss of protection unless and for such time as it can be considered to 
be ‘an integral part’ of a specific and co-ordinated military operation is in motion.  
In terms of the objective elements, planning as a mode of perpetration is very similar 
to the notion of conspiracy, but what makes planning different is that a planner designs the 
commission of an act that is perpetrated by others. International criminal law has taken 
slightly divergent approaches the conditions under which planning the commission of 
offences can be regarded as a distinct form of accessorial liability.  The first approach is that 
planning constitutes a distinct form of criminal liability punishable per se, that is, even if the 
planned crime is not in fact committed. 124  The second approach is that liability for the 
planning of criminal offences can arise on the basis acts that are yet to be committed, 
primarily attempts to commit crimes. 125 The third approach is that planning or the preparation 
of a crime is only punishable when followed by the actual commission of the planned offence 
126 The objective elements of planning are that one or more persons design the criminal 
conduct. 127  
Those who are liable for planning do not participate in the implementation of the 
criminal plan, and so strictly-speaking planners are considered to be accessories because of 
their participation in the formulation of a criminal plan rather than subsequent implementation 
and perpetration.128  However, if planners participate in its implementation, then they would 
be regarded as perpetrators or co-perpetrators.  Planning is therefore a mode of accessorial 
liability to be applied where an individual’s role is limited to participation in the process of 
formulating a hostile plan rather than perpetrating the belligerent act or in some way 
contributing to its execution. Furthermore, there must be evidence or intelligence that an 
individual’s planning or formulation of a plan substantially contributes to the perpetration 
hostile activities.129 
                                                          
124  Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (n 116)  386: ‘an accused may be held criminally responsible for planning 
alone’ because ‘planning constitutes a discrete form of responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute’. It is 
important to qualify this by stating that only the planning of large-scale international crimes may be punishable 
per se, due to the gravity of these crimes and the demands of policy to prevent them. In contradistinction, for 
crimes of lesser gravity, there is the argument that the doubt should be resolved in favour of the accused, and so 
the planning of lesser crimes may not be punished per se. 
125 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, 25 paragraph (3) (b).  
126 Akayesu (n 114) 475. Prosecutor v Rutaganda (n 43) 34. Prosecutor v Musema ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 
2000), 115. 
127 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004), 26.  
128 Prosecutor v Bagilishema (Trial Judgment) ICTR-95-1A-T (7 June 2001), 30. 
129 Kordić and Čerkez (n 127) 26. 
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As for the subjective elements of planning, it needs to be established that an individual 
intended the hostile act in question to be committed’. 130  All that needs to be demonstrated in 
this regard is that a person plans a hostile operation with an awareness of the substantial 
likelihood that a hostile act will be committed in the execution of that plan.  Planning 
activities performed with such awareness are to be regarded as accepting that hostile act,131 
and so where there is evidence that an individual’s plan substantially contributes to the 
perpetration of hostile activities then planning can be considered to be an ‘integral part’ of a 
specific and co-ordinated military operation. Where this can be demonstrated then this may 
thus lead to a deprivation of immunity from attack for such time as it can be considered to be 
‘an integral part’ of a specific and co-ordinated military operation is in motion.  
 
5. Ordering an act  
 
Whilst ordering may in one sense appear to be a form of indirect perpetration, international 
criminal law regards ordering as a form of indirect participation that results in accessorial 
rather than principal liability.132 Ordering is subjectively different from principal modes of 
liability in that it need not be established that a superior giving an unlawful order has the 
particular intention required for the underlying criminal act executed in pursuit of that order. 
Rather, the superior merely needs to be aware of the substantial likelihood that the physical 
perpetrators will act with the intention required by the particular crimes that have been 
executed. As such, ordering does not constitute a form of indirect perpetration, as the 
authority giving the order does not possess the intention of the physical perpetrators. In this 
regard, by itself, ordering can be considered to be to be a form of indirect participation in 
hostile acts.  Accordingly, the objective and subjective elements of this mode of liability will 
be set out to distinguish it from the notion of indirect perpetration before extrapolating the 
elements of this mode of liability to the concept of direct participation in hostilities.  In this 
way, the concept of ordering can be considered to be relevant for targeting the core leadership 
as well as the political or ideological cadre of an organized armed group. 
As for the objective elements, ordering requires no formal superior-subordinate 
relationship. Rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the individual who issued the order had 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., 31.  
132 Article 25 para (3) (a) and (b) of the ICC Statute (n 126); Updated Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopted 25 May 1993 by UNSC Resolution 827 (September 2009), Article 
7 para (1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Security Council resolution 955, 8 
November 1994, Article 6 para (1).  
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a form of de facto authority to instruct the perpetrators of the act or acts ordered. 133 This 
means that the individual issuing an order has a significant influence over the perpetrators 
such that they are compelled to obey.134 De facto authority to ‘instruct’ the physical 
perpetrators may be implied from the circumstances and as such there is no particular form in 
which an order must be given. 135 An order can be given orally or in writing and it can be 
made expressly or implicitly. Accordingly, the existence of an order can be proven by 
circumstantial evidence.136 Furthermore, each intermediary who is at least in a position of de 
facto authority and who passes on the order is considered to be reissuing the order, and can 
thus be held liable for ordering the commission of the crimes.137 
In order to target an individual for ordering the perpetration of a hostile act a causal 
link between the act of ordering and the physical perpetration of a crime needs to be 
demonstrated.  It is not necessary to demonstrate that the offence would not have been 
perpetrated in the absence of the order.138 According to one approach, perpetrators must 
commit the crimes in execution or furtherance of an order, although, according to another 
approach, it is sufficient if the physical perpetrators attempt to commit the crimes in execution 
or furtherance of the order. 139 
With regard to the subjective elements of ordering, it must be established that 
individual giving the order intended the hostile act to be committed, or was aware of the 
substantial likelihood that the commission of the hostile act would be a consequence of his 
acts, and so ordering with such awareness is to be regarded as accepting the hostile act.140 
This state of mind does not need to be explicit. Rather, it may be inferred from the 
                                                          
133 Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (n 120) 3, 75; Prosecutor v Semanza (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-97-20-
A (22 May 2005), 361; Kordić and Čerkez (n 127) 28; Prosecutor v Galić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-
98-29-A (30 November 2006), 176; Olásolo (n 116); C del Ponte, ‘Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale 
Crimes at the International Level. The Experience of the ICTY’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 549. 
134 Olásolo, ibid, 136; Semanza (Appeals Judgment) ibid, para 361. 
135 Blaskić (n 93) 660. 
136 Galić (Trial Judgment) (n 82) 168; Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Judgment) (n 87) 388.  In this regard, the 
approving presence of a superior at the scene of the crime while the crimes are being committed, or immediately 
afterwards, can be a relevant factor to infer that the superior ordered the commission of the crimes. 
137 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-95- 16-T (14 January 2000), 827, 862.  
138 Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Judgment) ( n 87) 332. 
139 Article 25 para (3) (b) of the ICC Statute (n 126).  
140 Blaskić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) (n 93) 41 & 42. In this way the mens rea standard for this offence is 
one of specific intent or recklessness. The threshold of recklessness was set at a relatively high threshold in 
Blaskić, in that ‘[t]he knowledge of any kind of risk, however low, does not suffice for the imposition of 
criminal responsibility … an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be 
incorporated into the legal standard…a person who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the 
substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens rea 
for establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to ordering. Ordering with such awareness has to be 
regarded as accepting that crime’. 
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circumstances, but in such circumstances it must be the only reasonable inference from the 
evidence.141 
Given that ordering it is not punishable per se, it is suggested that loss of protection 
from attack may not occur unless there is some indication of de facto authority over the 
physical perpetrators as well as some indication of a causal connection between the order and 
the hostile acts.  However, once hostile acts have been committed, then given the existence of 
a relationship of de facto authority over the perpetrators, then it is reasonable to suggest that 
this hierarchical relationship involving de facto authority of the core leadership as well as the 
political or ideological cadre of an organized armed group will persist for the duration of the 
hostilities.  This is because from a doctrinal point of view, it will be necessary to degrade the 
organizational structures that sustain hostilities, and therefore it is not only the core 
leadership, but also intermediaries who are in a position of de facto authority to reissue orders 
and have them executed by the physical perpetrators that can be targeted on an ongoing basis 
during hostilities. However, for targeting to occur on this basis, i.e. de facto authority to issue 
orders and have them executed by subordinates, then there needs to be reliable evidence or 
intelligence going towards this superior status. Targeting on this basis can thus only occur in 
the context of targeted operations in situations that meet the threshold of a common Article 3 
non-international armed conflict.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Criminal law modes of liability set out evolving conceptual frameworks for connecting 
individuals to crimes across a multiplicity of fact patterns and therefore suggest ways of 
linking individuals to hostilities as well as the membership of organised armed groups.  
Doctrinal developments relating to ‘full-spectrum’, ‘counterinsurgency’ and ‘stability’ 
operations lend credence to Van Creveld’s prediction that ‘the armed forces of the world will 
have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much 
of their heavy equipment and becoming more like the police’.142 This discussion has 
contributed towards an framework that better suits these changes in the strategic environment 
and in military doctrine by extrapolating principles derived from evolving criminal justice 
modes of liability to guide intelligence-based targeting analysis that can better ‘understand the 
                                                          
141 Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Judgment) (n 87) 333. 
142 M van Creveld, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly – Some Reflections on the Future of War’ (2000) 53(4) Naval 
War College Review, 26. 
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social dynamic that sustains on-going fighting’.143 In particular, it has sought to contribute 
towards the fundamental issue of distinguishing the indirect support activities of the general 
civilian population and mass base of popular support that lack proximity or a nexus with the 
surrounding hostilities from what can be broadly defined as the internal support structure of 
an organized armed group by putting participation and membership on a more analytical 
footing.  
This approach means that in the absence of manifestations of hostile intent at the 
tactical level, targeting on the basis of many supportive, clandestine and opportunistic forms 
of direct participation in hostilities as well as membership in an organized armed group on the 
basis of a ‘continuous combat function’ may only practically occur in the context of targeted 
operations that are planned at the operational level of command and which occur within a 
situation that has at least reached the threshold of common Article 3 non-international armed 
conflict, otherwise domestic criminal law and applicable human rights law will continue to 
apply. This serves to undergird the doctrine of positive identification by elucidating the 
conditions and criteria for establishing ‘reasonable certainty’ vis-à-vis civilian participation in 
hostilities or membership in ‘complex and diffuse organizational structures and networks’144 
in situations where there are no clear manifestations of hostile force or intent.  It also serves to 
constrain targeting decisions by suggesting a clearer framework for resolving doubt in 
indeterminate situations vis-à-vis civilians that would otherwise fall into a ‘grey area’ within 
targeting law. This reduces the likelihood of arbitrary or erroneous targeting and thus ensures 
that combat lines of operations do not end up being operationally and strategically counter-
productive. Thus in situations of armed conflict, this approach seeks to constrain extrajudicial 
or ‘targeted’ killing of civilians who are suspected of being terrorists, criminals or 
participating in hostilities.  Unbridled and extensive use of lethal force as a first resort can 
only serve to escalate hostilities. Nevertheless, this framework for understanding participation 
in hostilities does in no way obstruct the application of conventional military approaches and 
considerations where necessary.  
However, this is premised on the basis that the situation must at least have reached the 
threshold of a CA3 NIAC as indicated by the criteria in Boškoski as this marks the point at 
which it may be deemed appropriate to shift from a law and order paradigm to an armed 
conflict paradigm vis-à-vis targeting. This is because it is suggested that Boškoski provides 
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reasoned and authoritative objective guidelines for identifying those situations that exceed the 
capacity of the law enforcement paradigm, or, in other words, those situations where 
individualized threat assessments and standard law enforcement techniques may not be 
generally practicable across a full-spectrum operational environment. In other words, where 
the intensity and organization of group violence becomes such that the framework of law 
enforcement can no longer function due to the breakdown in the security environment, for 
example, where it poses ‘totally unreasonable risks to law-enforcement officials’ and where 
‘the State does not have sufficient control to carry out an arrest’, then recourse may be had to 
the legal framework of hostilities that allows for targeting on the basis of status as a member 
of an organized armed group.145 
Arguably, this can serve to prevent, as far as possible, any premature recourse to status 
based targeting that may result in unwarranted ‘extra-judicial’ or ‘targeted’ killing of 
suspected ‘terrorists’ and any consequent ‘collateral’ deprivation of life in grey area situations 
characterized by low levels of violence.  The CA3 threshold represents a high intensity of 
violence beyond what can be regarded as mere states of crisis or emergency to which the law 
enforcement regime of human rights law threat-based targeting can apply. In terms of the 
intensity criterion, consideration ought to be given to whether violence is sufficiently serious 
so as to amount to an armed conflict.146In terms of the organizational criterion, the more 
organized an armed group is, the greater the threat it represents and therefore the greater the 
challenge it will be for the ‘normal’ framework of law-enforcement to apply and so military 
means and methods are needed to reimpose public order. Essentially, to constitute an 
                                                          
145 David Kretzmer, ‘Rethinking Application of IHL In Non-International Armed Conflicts’(2009) 42 Israel 
Law Review, 35. 
146 Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarculovski (Trial Judgment) ICTY-04-82-T (10 July 2008), 177: Factors 
include include whether there has been an increase in and a spread of armed clashes over territory and over a 
period of time. In this regard account ought to be taken of the casualty level and the extent of the destruction 
caused by the fighting  as well as the effect of hostilities on civilians, for example by forcing them to flee from 
combat zones and whether civilians and/or civilian objects have been subject to direct or indiscriminate 
attacks.An assessment should also be made as to whether there has been any increase in the size of government 
armed forces as well as evidence of mobilization and distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict. 
Indicators in this regard include troop and unit deployment numbers, the formation and change of front lines 
between belligerent parties and whether high intensity ‘weapons of war’ such as ‘heavy weapons and other 
military equipment, such as tanks and other heavy vehicles’ have been used. Also relevant to the issue of 
mobilization of forces and matériel is whether military tactics and formations have been employed such as the 
mass deployment of forces to a crisis area, the closure of roads and the blocking and encirclement of  
conurbations and the use of mortar or artillery fire against them. Another key factor that is relevant to the 
intensity criterion is whether international organizations such as the UN Security Council have become involved 
over concerns about the situation presenting a threat to domestic, regional and international stability, and 
whether any resolutions have been passed in this regard.  Boškoski suggests that an account of the intensity or 
seriousness of hostilities can take place at a ‘more systematic level’. This may involve an analysis of the policy 
decisions, orders and instructions that lie behind ‘the way that organs of the State, such as the police and 
military, use force against armed groups’ at the various levels of conflict.  
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organized armed group for the purposes of common Article 3, there needs to be ‘some 
hierarchical structure’ and furthermore the ‘leadership requires the capacity to exert authority 
over its members’.147 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147 Boškoski, ibid, 196, 199: Boškoski sets out five indicative and interrelated criteria of what constitutes a 
sufficient degree of organization for there to be an armed conflict for the purposes of IHL. Firstly, there must be 
some form of command structure in place. This may be evidenced by the existence of what can be regarded as a 
‘general staff’ or a ‘high command’ which can issue political statements and communiqués as well as organize 
personnel, logistics and weapons, such as by appointing personnel to specific roles or tasks, giving orders and 
authorizing military operations. Furthermore, IHL can only apply where there is a command structure which 
allows the ‘high command’ to receive reports from all operational units within the chain of command and to 
establish and disseminate internal regulations that set out the hierarchical organization and structure of the 
armed group in terms of roles and duties at each level of the chain of command. Secondly, for a group to qualify 
as being ‘organized’, it must have the ability to carry out military operations in an organized fashion and control 
territory. Factors to consider in this regard are whether the group has the ability to establish a ‘unified military 
strategy’ so as to be able ‘to conduct large scale military operations’, whether it has ‘the capacity to control 
territory’ (rather than actually controlling it), and whether ‘there is territorial division into zones of 
responsibility’. Furthermore, there must be some evidence that commanders and operational units can ‘co-
ordinate their actions’ and effectively disseminate ‘written and oral orders and decisions’. Thirdly, an organized 
armed group is one which has a sufficient level of logistical and organizational capabilities. For example, an 
assessment is to be made of a group’s ability to recruit new members and to provide them with military training 
and to control and organize the supply of weapons and uniforms as well as its ability to link and co-ordinate all 
levels of the chain of command through a communications system. Fourthly, an armed group must also be 
sufficiently organized so as to ensure a level of discipline and demonstrate the ability to implement common 
Article 3. Factors relevant in this respect include whether there is a system of internal regulations and 
disciplinary rules in place as well as mechanisms such as proper training and supervision to ensure that they are 
disseminated to members of the organized armed group. Fifthly, Boškoski suggests that an ‘organized’ armed 
group is one with the ability to “speak with one voice” in the course of political negotiations. In this regard, 
account may be taken of the group’s capacity ‘to act on behalf of its members in political negotiations with 
representatives of international organisations and foreign countries’ as well as its ability to negotiate and 
conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords’. 
